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This paper uses survey data to investigate empirically the importance of corruption in 
determining firm performance in Africa. We allow for the possibility of perception bias on the 
part of the respondents and for corruption being endogenous. We find that corruption is linked 
to significant adverse effects on firm performance in two ways. At the firm (or “local”) level, 
companies that pay bribes have 20 percent lower levels of output per worker. At the economy-
wide (or “global”) level, firms in countries with pervasive corruption are some 70 per cent 
less efficient than firms in countries free of corruption. We thus provide evidence that 

















* The data on which this paper are based are drawn from the Africa Competitiveness Report 
2000/2001. We are indebted to Lisa Cook, Jeffrey Sachs, and Sara Sievers for making these 
data available to us.   1
I. INTRODUCTION 
For economists, providing an explanation for Africa’s history of poor economic growth 
remains a central theoretical and empirical challenge. Over the past decade or so, prominent 
studies have accounted for the continent’s generally stagnant development trend by 
emphasising the respective roles of human capital [Barro, 1991], geography and natural 
resources [Sachs and Warner, 1 997]; ethnic diversity [Easterly and Levine, 1997], risk 
[Collier and Gunning, 1999], health [Gallup and Sachs, 2001]; and social capital and 
institutions [Knack and Keefer, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2001].  Among these competing explanations, those focusing on public institutions 
have gathered particular momentum in recent years.  
 
A leading example of the institutions hypothesis is given by Hall and Jones [1999], which 
argues that social infrastructure can explain virtually all of the very large differences observed 
in cross-country levels of output per worker,  with social infrastructure defined as “the 
institutions and government policies that determine the economic environment within which 
individuals accumulate skills, and firms accumulate capital and produce output.” [p.84] They 
measure social infrastructure by combining an index of institutional quality with the well-
known Sachs-Warner [1995] index of economic openness.  Hall and Jones use this joint 
measure to argue that poorly performing economies are those with poor social infrastructure, 
and that countries’ low rates of human and physical capital formation are a consequence of 
poor social infrastructure rather than the underlying cause of poor performance. In this paper 
we explore one dimension of the social infrastructure argument, the extent of corruption, as a 
determinant of firm performance in Africa. But unlike previous studies that typically measure 
corruption’s links to economic performance at the national level, we use firm-level measures   2
of reported and perceived bribe-paying to test links between corruption and firms’ actual 
levels of output per worker.
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In analysing the consequences of corruption for firm performance, an important distinction 
needs to be drawn between the direct effects of firm-level (what we call “local”) corruption 
and the indirect effects of economy-wide (or “global”) corruption. Shleifer and Vishny [1993] 
presents a formal model of how centralized corruption in a bureaucracy can have  better 
outcomes for the availability of public goods and growth than decentralised uncoordinated 
corruption. Competition may increase or decrease corruption depending on whether the 
corruption involves theft. Bliss and Di Tella [1997] argues that the consequences of 
competition on corruption will depend on the structure of firm costs. Both these papers draw 
on persuasive examples of the importance of corruption for firm behaviour and welfare 
outcomes. In this paper we pose an empirical analogue to these analytical papers. Can the 
quantitative importance of high levels of uncoordinated local level corruption be identified 
and measured?  
 
To investigate this question, proxies are required for measuring local and global corruption. 
This paper aims to show that such measures can be constructed and their impact on firm 
performance demonstrated. In doing so we can investigate the relative importance of local and 
global corruption and provide some evidence as to the quantitative importance of the 
argument advanced by Shleifer and Vishny [1993] that competitive uncoordinated corruption 
may have substantial global effects. 
 
The next section presents the framework in which we assess the effects of corruption on firm 
performance. Section III presents the empirical strategy and data. Evidence of the effects of   3
corruption on productivity is set out in Section IV under the assumption that corruption is 
exogenous. This assumption is tested in Section V. A final section concludes.  
 
II. SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AS A DETERMINANT OF FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Our empirical question is whether a link can be found between firms paying bribes and their 
underlying efficiency. To assess this, we assume a simple Cobb-Douglas production 
technology with constant returns to scale: 
 
(1)      y ij = aij (zij, Zj ) (kij 
a lij 
(1-a) ) + ç’ ×  +  åij   
 
where yij denotes output of the i
th firm in the j
th country, a is the level of technology, k is the 
capital stock,  l is the number of workers,  X is a vector of firm-specific characteristics 
described in more detail below and åij is an error term.  
. Corruption is hypothesised to affect the underlying efficiency with which firms in an 
economy operate. It is further hypothesized that the direct effects of firm-level (again, “local”) 
corruption,  zij, and economy-wide (“global”) corruption, Zj,  can be shown to have distinct 
effects on underlying firm efficiency.  
 
In our model, local corruption, zij, is based on firms’ need to access publicly regulated goods. 
Such access is determined by bureaucrats, whose official salaries are not linked to the 
distribution of that good. Each firm interacts with multiple bureaucrats in order to obtain all 
the publicly regulated goods it needs. Bureaucrats have the opportunity to extract extra, 
unofficial payments or bribes, b, from firms in return for access to the firm’s desired goods.  
   4
To the extent that local corruption exists in an economy, global corruption must by definition 
be equal to the sum of the local bribes. We define zij as an indicator function such that it takes 
a value of 1 if b>0 and 0 if b=0, yielding an aggregating relationship where: 
 
(2)          Zj = Ó zij  " i in each j 
 
Thus a second empirical issue exists regarding whether  Zj, the economy-wide aggregate 
measure of bribery, has an identifiable impact on aij in addition to the effect of zij. If the sum 
of local bribes gives rise to a negative productivity effect through global corruption then the 
bureaucrat is creating a negative externality by extracting the marginal bribe. This lowers the 
pool of bribe resources available to all bureaucrats from all firms. If this externality is large 
relative to the direct local effect of corruption, then it is possible that endemic corruption will 
yield small returns to a bureaucrat extracting bribes.   
 
In measuring firm efficiency, output per worker forms our main variable of interest alongside 
zij and Zj. Taking logs and rearranging equation (1) into an empirical specification we have: 
 
(3)    ln (yij / lij )= â0 + â1 ln (kij / lij
 ) + â2 zij + â3 Zj + ç’ × + åij    
 
 
One obvious concern with this approach is the possible endogeneity between corruption and 
productivity. Theoretically, better performing firms should provide the greatest resource base 
for corrupt officials to target with bribery, which would yield a positively biased estimate of 
â2 in OLS. On the other hand, low productivity firms might be more willing to pay bribes as a 
short-cut to overcoming their own inability to compete in a market, which would lead to   5
negatively biased estimates of â2 .  Slightly more formally (and dropping subscripts), it could 
be that we could write   
 
(4)        z = f [ (y/l), exogenous variables]  
 
where f is some a priori unknown function. Our ability to correctly measure the impact of 
corruption on efficiency depends on our ability to identify factors determining corruption that 
do not enter the production function. Section V discusses this issue in greater detail below.  
 
III. THE DATA 
Our data are taken from survey results collected in preparation of the Africa Competitiveness 
Report 2000/2001 (ACR), an analysis of 27 African economies co-ordinated jointly by the 
Center for International Development at Harvard University and the Geneva-based World 
Economic Forum. Survey responses used in this data set were collected throughout the last six 
months of 1999. The survey data contain information on firms’ sales and recorded value of 
assets, both in US dollars. These measures of output and capital enable us to create a measure 
of (the natural log of) firms’ output per worker, LOGYL; (the natural log of) capital stock per 
worker, LOGKL; and (the natural log of) size of labour force, LOGLAB. Employment is 
measured as the total number of full-time equivalent employees, with those who work part 
time counted as half a full-time worker. Complete information for our variables of interest is 
available for 505 firms.
2  
 
It is important to note the nature of the firms surveyed for the ACR. The bulk of the survey 
questions aim to capture business managers’ perceptions about how elements of their 
economic environment compare to elements in other economies, so the survey itself is   6
directed at managers who have cross-border business experience. As a result, compared to the 
universe of firms within each country, the sample is biased toward managers of larger firms, 
as well as those that are involved in the tradable sector. As Appendix B shows, 66 percent of 
the companies sampled are exporters, a much larger proportion than one would find in a 
typical African economy. The median sized firm has 155 employees, which is also much 
higher than the median in most African economies.  Furthermore, the number of surveys with 
complete data in each country varies tremendously, ranging in from 45 in Zimbabwe to 2 in 
Burkina Faso, so this alongside the clear sampling bias places limits on the extent to which we 
can generalise our regression results as evidence of overall trends in African economies. 
Nonetheless, the data set does offer a rare opportunity to study links between corruption and 
firm performance across a large number of African countries.  
 
To measure local corruption, zij, we draw upon ACR questions which ask if “firms like yours 
typically need to make extra, unofficial payments” for access to each of the following 
publicly-regulated goods: connection to public services (e.g., electricity, phone); acquisition 
of licenses and permits; dealing with taxes and tax collection; gaining government contracts; 
and dealing with customs/imports.  For each of these areas of possible bribe-paying, 
respondents answered on a scale from 1=“always” to 6=“never.”
3 We interpret this question 
as a thinly veiled means of asking whether the respondent’s firm typically needs to make such 
bribe payments. We then calibrated these variables to binary form such that answers ranging 
from 4=“sometimes” through 1=“always” are given a  value of one while responses of 
5=“seldom” and 6=“never” are given a value of zero. These variables were named 
SERVICEYES (for the public services question), LICENSEYES (for the licenses and permits 
question), TAXYES (for the tax collection question), GOVYES (for the government contract 
question), and CUSTOMSYES (for the customs and imports question). From these five   7
measures we in turn constructed our main measure of zij, LOCAL, which takes a value of 1 if 
any of these firm-level corruption variables takes a value of 1.  
 
To measure global corruption, Zj, we follow three parallel approaches. The first uses an ACR 
survey question that asks about firm managers’ broad perceptions of corruption in their 
country: “In your country, irregular, additional payments connected with import and export 
permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection or loan 
applications,” and then lists a scale of responses between 1 and 6, where 1 represents “are 
required for effective business,” and 6 indicates “are rare in the business community.” From 
this question we created the binary variable GLOBAL, which takes the value of 1 when 
respondents answered 1, 2 or 3 on the six-point scale. The second approach is of the bottom-
up variety. It takes the average LOCAL score in each country to create a variable named 
AVLOCAL, or the average frequency of reported firm-level corruption in each economy in 
the sample. The third approach is similar to the second, in that it calculates the average 
GLOBAL score in each country to create AVGLOBAL. Thus while AVLOCAL measures Zj 
as the average reported level of local corruption, AVGLOBAL measures Zj as the average 
perceived level of global corruption. 
 
One possible concern with the use of these measures of corruption i s that they might be 
capturing the labour productivity effects of some other omitted variable, such as the overall 
level of public infrastructure or public services. To test for this possibility, we used other 
survey questions to create an overall index of public infrastructure. Survey question I.15 asks 
respondents, “Please rate the overall quality, integrity and efficiency of services delivered by 
the following public agencies or services,” and then lists thirteen judicial, infrastructure, 
social, security and legislative services.  Possible answers range from 1= “very good” to 6=   8
“very bad.” We calculated a weighted average of responses within each of the five public 
institution sub-categories to construct an overall measure of public services, PUBLIC.  
 
One might also be concerned that any survey-based results could be driven by the perception 
bias of people who consistently overestimate (or underestimate) the quality of their 
environment. Stated otherwise, any negative productivity results linked to corruption might be 
driven by inefficient habitual complainers. Here we draw upon the work of Kaufman and Wei 
[1999], who constructed a “kvetch” variable to test whether any of their own measured effects 
of corruption were driven by respondents being overly pessimistic on everything. We 
constructed our own WHINGE variable similar to “kvetch” by calculating each respondent’s 
deviation from the country mean for a very broad survey question that asks about the national 
business environment. The specific question w e used for this variable asked, “‘I have full 
confidence in the ability of my country’s financial system to provide financing to private 
firms like mine.’ To what degree do you agree with this statement?” Possible answers range 
from 1 (=Fully agree) to 6 (= Strongly disagree) and WHINGE scores were thus calculated as 
deviations from the country mean. WHINGE scores could, of course, be capturing a wide 
range of effects, including a firm’s genuinely limited access to financing, but it nonetheless 
provides a useful test for whether â2 and â3 are sensitive to the inclusion of such a control.     9
IV. THE DETERMINANTS OF PRODUCTIVITY 
In order to test for the effects of corruption on productivity we estimate equation (3) using 
both the local and global measures of c orruption. Our baseline ordinary least squares 
specification is written as: 
 
(5) LOGYL = CONSTANT + â1 * LOGKL + â2 * LOCAL + â3 * GLOBAL  
+ ç1’ * INDUSTRY CONTROLS + ç2’ * COUNTRY CONTROLS    
    + ç3’ * FIRM CHARACTERISTICS + åij 
 
Building on this specification, the empirical strategy proceeds in four steps.  The first is 
presented in columns [1] through [4] of Table I, which controls for country fixed effects on 
labour productivity. This allows us to test for the effects of  zij, or LOCAL. The inherent 
limitation in this step is that, when country fixed effects are included, one cannot test whether 
the country dummy is picking up the effect of global corruption. The second step addresses 
this by dropping the country fixed effects in columns [5] through [9] of Table I. In doing so 
we are open to the objection that we bias the coefficients on the regressors. This is addressed 
in the third step, shown in Tables II and III, where we examine whether the estimated country 
differences in productivity can be explained by aggregate corruption. Both Tables I and III 
assume corruption to be exogenous. This assumption is tested in the fourth step, presented in 
Tables IV through VI, which investigate our ability to identify the determinants as well as 
effects of local and global corruption. 
 
Column [1] of Table I shows results for the baseline productivity specification, where the 
reference firm for the equation is a domestically-owned South African manufacturer that sells 
only in the domestic market. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country-level.   10
As noted in the bottom section of the table, the baseline regression controls for industry and 
country dummies, although coefficients on those dummies are not reported here in order to 
conserve space. Looking at the coefficient on LOGKL in regression 1, we see it is equal to 
0.64 with high significance. This result is repeated throughout Table I, where we find 
coefficients on this variable consistently in the range between 0.62 and 0.66. The coefficient 
on LOGLAB  is small and insignificant, supporting our assumption of constant returns to 
scale.  
 
The subsequent coefficient on EXPORTER, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm 
has any exports, is positive and significant just short of the five percent level. This evidence is 
in line with other studies that link exporting with higher productivity, see Bigsten  et al. 
[2001]. Meanwhile, the measure of monopoly (MONOPOLY) suggests a large adverse effect 
on underlying efficiency.
4 FOREIGN, another dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if firms 
are at least 50 percent owned by foreigners, shows a highly significant positive link to 
productivity.  
 
Table I, column [2] introduces our first measure of global corruption, GLOBAL. Since we 
control for country fixed effects in this regression we would anticipate that this variable, if 
properly capturing global corruption, would be insignificant. This is indeed the case. Column 
[3] then presents results for when the local measure of corruption, LOCAL, is added to the 
productivity equation. Quite different from the result for the GLOBAL measure of corruption, 
the coefficient on LOCAL is negative and significant. The point estimate implies that firms 
engaging in any form of direct bribery to government bureaucrats are on average 18 percent 
less efficient than their counterparts that do not pay bribes.
5  
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Column [4] of Table I introduces two additional controls, one for omitted variable bias, 
PUBLIC – i.e., in case LOCAL is capturing a broader dynamic of poor public infrastructure 
rather than just corruption  – and one for perception bias, WHINGE. At first glance the 
positive sign on PUBLIC may be puzzling, since it suggests that firms with worse 
assessments of overall public infrastructure have higher productivity.
6 We interpret this result 
as showing that more productive firms simply have higher standards for quality of services 
and thus assess government services more harshly. This interpretation is supported by the fact 
that the average PUBLIC score in South Africa of 3.29 (see Appendix B for the full list of 
country averages) is very similar to that of Uganda (3.52) and Burkina Faso (3.52), suggesting 
that managers in different countries compare their public infrastructures to different 
international reference points.  
 
It is important to note that there appears to be a good reason why the interpretation of the 
survey-based measure of PUBLIC is less clear than the survey-based measure of LOCAL. 
One needs to remember that the underlying survey question for PUBLIC frames possible 
answers on the dimension of “very good” versus “very bad.” This line of questioning lends 
itself much more to perception bias than do the underlying corruption questions that ask about 
corruption on a much less (although admittedly still) subjective scale ranging from “never” to 
“always.” The core corruption variables are indeed quite modest in their measurement 
aspirations, since their dummy variable structure seeks only to capture whether bribes are paid 
rather than the overall frequency or amount of payments on a firm-by-firm basis. In any event, 
regardless of the precise meaning of the PUBLIC variable, what is more important for the 
purposes of this paper is that the coefficient on LOCAL increases rather than decreases in size 
and significance when PUBLIC is included.  
   12
The regressions presented so far include country dummies, so any global corruption effect on 
productivity should be hidden by their inclusion. In Column 5, we test this hypothesis by 
running the same specification as in column [4], but this time removing the country dummies. 
GLOBAL is now significant at the 5 per cent level with a point estimate of –0.25, suggesting 
a strong negative effect of global corruption  in addition to the negative effect of local 
corruption. The coefficient on LOCAL more than doubles from column [4] to column [5].  
 
In column [6] we test our second measure of global corruption, AVLOCAL. Here we 
introduce country-level averages of all the firm-level control variables that are significant in 
regression [5]. Notably, AVLOCAL is significant at better than one percent levels, now with a 
coefficient of –1.16. It is the only country-level average that is significant in equation [6]. This 
result implies that the average firm in an entirely corrupt economy is 69 per cent (1-e
-1.16) less 
productive than a similar firm in an entirely corruption-free economy. Notably, even when we 
include AVLOCAL, the original coefficients on the firm-level controls, including LOCAL, 
are essentially unchanged from column [4]. The regression appears to be capturing distinct 
productivity effects of global and local corruption and the latter is more than twice as 
important as the former.  
 
As a robustness test for the result in column [6], column [7] presents the same specification, 
but includes our third measure of  Zj, AVGLOBAL, in place of AVLOCAL.  These two 
variables have a simple correlation of 0.86 across the 505 firms and Figure I shows 
graphically the close relationship between AVLOCAL and AVGLOBAL. The average 
reported level of economy-wide corruption is closely linked to the average perceived level. 
Given the high degree of correlation between AVGLOBAL and AVLOCAL, it is not 
surprising that the results in column [7] are so similar to those in column [6]. Columns [8] and   13
[9] confirm that similar results for global corruption can be obtained either from the average 
level of local corruption, AVLOCAL or the average level of our global measure, 
AVGLOBAL. 
 
It is possible that the results in columns [5] through [9] of Table I are driven by the bias in the 
coefficients that occurs when dropping the country fixed effects. To test whether this is the 
case we ran regressions with the country-level fixed effects of column [4] of Table I as the 
dependent variable in an equation. The coefficients for these country fixed effects are 
presented in Table II and the regression results are displayed in Table III. Here we use the 
country-level averages of EXPORTER, MONOPOLY, FOREIGN, PUBLIC, GLOBAL and 
LOCAL to attempt to explain the country-level differences in productivity.  
 
Table III reports results for all the variables that were found to affect firm-level productivity 
in Table I. It is clear that the results of columns [5] through [9] in Table I are confirmed in that 
the level of global corruption is found to have large and statistically significant effects on the 
country-level productivity fixed effects, regardless of whether AVLOCAL or AVGLOBAL is 
used as the regressor. The small sample size in this regression clearly limits our room for 
interpretation, but the strength of the result is nonetheless notable. Indeed, the strong negative 
relationship between AVLOCAL and the country fixed effects is clearly visible in Figure II.  
 
The R -squared in Table III also deserves some mention. In the most parsimonious 
specifications of columns [4] and [5], the R-squared is less than 0.4.  While it is striking that 
there is such a high degree of correlation between AVLOCAL and country-level differences 
in productivity, it is also clear that AVLOCAL is far from the only factor affecting output per 
worker.   14
 
V. IS CORRUPTION ENDOGENOUS? 
It is possible that poorly performing firms attempt to circumvent market competition by 
seeking short-cuts through bribe payments so that causation is running from low-productivity 
to corruption. In this section we report on some tests for the endogeneity of our corruption 
measures. We do this by performing a Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test, following Davidson 
and MacKinnon [1993].  
 
The results are reported in Table IV, which includes estimates obtained from both the first and 
second stage of the test. The first stage entails an estimation of LOCAL as the dependent 
variable, with the exogenous variables on the right hand side.  We found firm size 
(LOGLAB), WHINGE, and one other survey question, FAIR, to be significant when assessed 
as independent variables against LOCAL as a dependent variable. FAIR is based on a firm-
level question that asks “In resolving business disputes, do you believe your country’s court 
system to be fair and impartial?” with possible answers again ranging from 1= “Always” to 
6= “Never.” Unreported regressions found that smaller firms are more likely on average to 
encounter corruption, as are those with higher WHINGE scores, and those who find their 
country’s court system to be less fair. Table V shows the average LOCAL score across a 
range of firm sizes.  
 
The DWH test is performed by obtaining the residuals from the first stage regression and then 
testing whether those residuals are significant in the original OLS equation of interest. If they 
are significant, then endogeneity cannot be rejected. We perform this test two ways, once with 
the first stage as an OLS and a second time with the first stage as a logit equation.  The bottom 
panel of Table IV shows the results from the first stage regression, and the top panel presents   15
results for the second stage. As Table IV shows, the DWH test rejects the endogeneity of 
LOCAL in the main productivity specification.  When LOCAL is estimated by both OLS and 
logit in the first stage, the ensuing residual, LOCAL_RES, is not significant in the second 
stage.  
 
In Table VI we perform another DWH test for the endogeneity of global corruption, 
AVLOCAL. Here the sample is again restricted to 27 observations so we caution against over 
interpretation, but the results still reject endogeneity. Column [1] of Table VI presents only 
the OLS results with AVLOCAL as the dependent variable. Here one sees that average 
capital/labour ratios are significantly and negatively linked to LOCAL, as are worse (higher) 
scores on public services. Column [2] indicates a reduced form of the first stage, including 
only AVLOGKL, AVPUBLIC and AVMONOPOLY, and the second stage results in the top 
panel.  Here one sees that AVLOCAL is highly significant with a value of  –1.42, with a 
coefficient of slightly larger magnitude than the estimate of approximately  –1.1 found in 
Table III, and AVLOCAL_RES is nowhere near significant, with a t-statistic of just over 1. In 
case the column [2] result for AVMONOPOLY is driven by statistical artefact rather than 
underlying reality, column [3] presents an even more reduced first stage, with the second 
stage coefficient on AVLOCAL not statistically different from the previous regression.  
 
These DWH tests suggest that our OLS results are adequate for gauging the relative 
influences of local and global corruption.
7 Thus our preferred estimate for the coefficient on 
LOCAL is –0.26, taken from regression [4] in Table I with country fixed effects, and our 
preferred estimate for the coefficient on AVLOCAL is the –1.3, taken from column [8] of 
Table I. These results imply that the global public bad effect of corruption is three times the 
magnitude of the local effect.
8    16
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper set out to determine whether a link can be found between corruption and 
underlying firm productivity in Africa, with a distinction between the effects of local and 
global corruption. We have found that firms operating in economies where bribes are 
pervasive are on average only one third as productive as their counterparts operating in bribe-
free economies. The public bad effects of corruption appear to dominate the local effects. 
 
Our ability to produce these estimates is due to the existence of cross-country data from 
Africa on firm performance that includes detailed information on firm structure and on the 
corruption experienced by the firm. We control for the possible subjectivity of respondents 
regarding the extent of corruption and the effects of public infrastructure. The similarity in 
results for global  corruption obtained when using the average country-level regression to 
those based on the firm-level regressions suggests that the coefficients on the firm level 
variables are not biased when we drop the country fixed effects.  
 
Since we do not have panel data, we cannot control for country fixed effects when estimating 
the effects of global corruption. It could therefore be argued that our estimates for the effects 
of global corruption are biased up as we confound the corruption effect with all the other 
country-level differences which affect firm performance. That argument is clearly correct. 
However the county-level corruption variables are significant when we do control as much as 
possible for differences across countries. These controls include the trade orientation of the 
sample within each country (the AVEXPORTER variable), the extent of monopoly (the 
AVMONOPOLY variable), and the extent of foreign ownership (AVFOREIGN). We would 
argue that the data provide strong evidence that corruption is an important  determinant of   17
firm performance in African economies. Moreover, focusing simply on the local impact of 
corruption while ignoring the global effect would be to misunderstand fundamentally the 
nature of corruption’s effect on firm performance in Africa.    18





Regression  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
                   
LOGKL  0.64***  0.64***  0.64***  0.62***  0.66***  0.63***  0.63***  0.62***  0.63*** 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
LOGLAB  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.002  0.01  0.001  0.001 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
EXPORTER  0.19*  0.19*  0.19*  0.17*  0.27***  0.18*  0.18*  0.21**  0.21** 
  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.08) 
MONOPOLY  -0.77***  -0.77***  -0.76***  -0.75***  -0.88***  -0.74***  -0.75***  -0.84***  -0.87*** 
  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.20)  (0.19) 
FOREIGN  0.31**  0.31**  0.31**  0.23**  0.25***  0.24**  0.23**  -0.24**  0.26** 
  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
GLOBAL    -0.02  -0.01  0.03  -0.25**  -0.09  -0.02  -0.10  -0.03 
    (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
LOCAL      -0.20**  -0.26***  -0.62***  -0.26***  -0.35***  -0.28**  -0.39** 
      (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.14)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.10) 
PUBLIC        0.25***  0.24**  0.25***  0.25***  0.29***  0.31*** 
        (0.06)  (0.11)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.09) 
WHINGE        -0.08**  -0.05  -0.08***  -0.08***  -0.09***  -0.08** 
        (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
AVEXPORTER            0.30  0.34     
            (0.49)  (0.47)     
AVMONOPOLY            -1.99  -2.14*     
            (1.35)  (1.25)     
AVFOREIGN            0.14  0.37     
            (0.34)  (0.40)     
AVLOCAL            -1.16***    -1.33***   
            (0.32)    (0.23)   
AVGLOBAL              -1.30***    -1.45*** 
              (0.37)    (0.26) 
AVPUBLIC            -0.02  -0.02     
            (0.14)  (0.17)     
Constant  4.18***  4.19***  4.26***  3.68***  3.03***  3.72***  3.49***  3.78***  3.58*** 
  (0.45)  (0.45)  (0.45)  (0.54)  (0.55)  (0.57)  (0.57)  (0.45)  (0.44) 
Country 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No  No 
Industry 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs.  505  505  505  505  505  505  505  505  505 
R
2  0.71  0.71  0.72  0.73  0.66  0.70  0.70  0.69  0.69 
Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the country level, are indicated in parentheses.   
*** denotes p-values at the 1% level or lower; ** denotes 5% level; * denotes 10% level. 
 
Industry controls included in the regressions are: agriculture, construction, electricity, mining, commerce and 
services, finance; tourism, transportation and communications; and “other.”   19
TABLE II. COUNTRY FIXED EFFECT VALUES FROM TABLE I, REGRESSION 4 
 
         
Country  Value    Country  Value 
Angola  -1.311    Morocco  -0.030 
Botswana   0.131    Mozambique  -1.043 
Burkina Faso   0.472    Namibia   0.019 
Cameroon  -1.125    Nigeria  -0.697 
Cote d’Ivoire   0.465    Senegal   0.274 
Egypt  -1.605    Seychelles   0.294 
Ethiopia  -1.111    South Africa   0.000 
Ghana  -0.286    Swaziland  -0.476 
Kenya  -0.835    Tanzania  -0.453 
Lesotho  -0.271    Tunisia   0.032 
Madagascar  -1.052    Uganda  -0.726 
Malawi  -0.668    Zambia  -1.038 
Mali   0.266    Zimbabwe  -0.700 
Mauritius  -0.290       
      Sample Mean  -0.44 
      Std. Deviation   0.59 
 
 
TABLE III. COUNTRY-LEVEL PRODUCTIVITY REGRESSIONS 
 
Dependent Variable  Country Fixed Effects from Table I, Regression 4 
Regression  1  2  3  4  5 
AVEXPORTER  0.79  0.64  0.74     
  (0.54)  (0.51)  (0.50)     
AVMONOPOLY  -1.43  -1.16  -1.16     
  (1.80)  (1.99)  (1.84)     
AVFOREIGN  -0.05  -0.18  -0.19     
  (0.37)  (0.46)  (0.45)     
AVPUBLIC  -0.19         
  (0.23)         
AVLOCAL  -0.73  -1.01***  -0.39  -1.10***   
  (0.52)  (0.28)  (0.44)  (0.29)   
AVGLOBAL      -0.99**    -1.40*** 
      (0.46)    (0.27) 
Constant  0.22  -0.16  -0.11  -0.18  -0.22 
  (0.67)  (0.48)  (0.46)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
Obs.  27  27  27  27  27 
R
2  0.47  0.44  0.51  0.35  0.37 
The dependent variable is the coefficients on the fixed effect from regression 4 in Table I. Huber-White corrected 
standard errors are indicated in parentheses.  *** denotes p-values at the 1% level or lower; ** denotes 5% level; 
* denotes 10% level. 
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TABLE IV: DURBIN-WU-HAUSMAN TESTS FOR ENDOGENEITY OF LOCAL 
 
    1
ST
 STAGE OLS  1
ST
 STAGE LOGIT 
  Regression  1  2 
2
nd Stage Results  LOGKL  0.62***  0.60*** 
(LOGYL as Dep. Variable)    (0.04)  (0.04) 
  EXPORTER  0.17*  0.20** 
    (0.09)  (0.09) 
  MONOPOLY  -0.71***  -0.61*** 
    (0.22)  (0.19) 
  FOREIGN  0.19  0.26** 
    (0.11)  (0.11) 
  GLOBAL  0.05  -0.06 
    (0.11)  (0.10) 
  LOCAL  -0.98*  -0.37** 
    (0.53)  (0.15) 
  LOCAL_RES  0.75  0.05 
    (0.56)  (0.06) 
  PUBLIC  0.30***  0.24*** 
    (0.08)  (0.06) 
  WHINGE  -0.05  -0.07** 
    (0.04)  (0.03) 
1
st Stage Results  LOGKL  -0.004  -0.04 
(LOCAL as Dep. Variable)    (0.01)  (0.08) 
  EXPORTER  -0.01  -0.04 
    (0.04)  (0.29) 
  MONOPOLY  0.07  0.49 
    (0.08)  (0.74) 
  FOREIGN  -0.07*  -0.50* 
    (0.04)  (0.28) 
  GLOBAL  0.11**  0.63** 
    (0.05)  (0.29) 
  PUBLIC  0.07***  0.47*** 
    (0.02)  (0.16) 
  WHINGE  0.02  0.11 
    (0.01)  (0.08) 
  LOGLAB  -0.03***  -0.25*** 
    (0.01)  (0.08) 
  FAIR  0.04**  0.29*** 
    (0.02)  (0.11) 
  Country Controls in 1
st & 
2
nd stage?  Yes  Yes 




Yes  Yes 
  Observations  498  485 
  1
st stage R
2  0.43  0.38 
  F-statistic for significance of 
ANY_RES in 2
nd stage  1.77  0.81 
  p-value for F-test  0.20  0.38 
The 1
st and 2
nd stage constant terms are not reported in order to conserve space. Robust standard errors, 
corrected for clustering at the country level, are indicated in parentheses.  *** denotes p-values at the 
1% level or lower; ** denotes 5% level; * denotes 10% level.   21
TABLE V: AVERAGE LOCAL PREVALENCE AMONG DIFFERENT FIRM SIZES  
 
Firm Size 






<20  72  0.76  0.43 
20-49.5  72  0.64  0.48 
50-99.5  69  0.61  0.49 
100-299.5  95  0.65  0.48 
300-999.5  104  0.47  0.50 
>1000  93  0.41  0.50 
   22
 
TABLE VI. TEST FOR ENDOGENEITY OF AVLOCAL 
  Regression  1  2  3 
2
nd Stage 
Results  AVANY    -1.42***  -1.27*** 
(Country Fixed       (0.21)  (0.45) 
Effects as Dep.   AVLOCAL_RES    0.66  0.28 
Variable)      (0.56)  (0.85) 
  Constant    0.36***  0.27 
      (0.12)  (0.27) 
1
st Stage Results  AVLOGKL  -0.10**  -0.11***  -0.07** 
(AVLOCAL as 
Dep. Variable)    (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
  AVPUBLIC  0.25***  0.24***  0.24*** 
    (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
  AVMONOPOLY  1.66  1.46**   
    (0.73)  (0.65)   
  AVEXPORTER  0.11     
    (0.32)     
  AVFOREIGN  -0.08     
    (0.30)     
  AVLOGLAB  -0.09     
    (0.06)     
  Constant  1.02*  0.73*  0.45 
    (0.56)  (0.40)  (0.45) 
  Observations  27  27  27 
  1
st stage R
2  0.57  0.52  0.40 





  1.37  0.11 
  p-value for F-test    0.25  0.75 
The dependent variable in the 2
nd stage is the coefficient on the country 
fixed effect from regression [4] in Table I.  Huber-White corrected 
standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** denotes p-values at the 
1% level or lower; ** denotes 5% level; * denotes 10% level.  
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APPENDIX A: SECTORAL BREAKDOWN OF FIRMS IN SAMPLE (N=505) 
   
Number of firms indicating their “main business” is in: 






















storage  Other 
AGO  4  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  0  0  1 
BFA  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1 
BWA  24  1  1  3  1  0  0  6  6  2  1  1  6 
CIV  4  1  0  2  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  1 
CMR  5  2  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  3 
EGY  35  3  1  5  1  0  1  7  0  3  9  3  7 
ETH  18  1  0  3  0  2  0  5  2  3  0  0  4 
GHA  18  1  0  3  1  0  1  7  3  4  0  1  2 
KEN  32  2  0  4  0  0  2  17  3  1  1  2  6 
LSO  7  0  0  2  0  2  0  1  1  0  1  0  0 
MAR  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  5  0  0  1  0  2 
MDG  36  4  0  3  3  3  1  7  1  0  1  0  14 
MLI  4  1  0  1  0  0  0  3  0  0  0  0  0 
MOZ  14  2  0  1  0  1  1  4  3  1  1  0  2 
MUS  16  0  0  3  1  1  0  7  4  3  0  1  0 
MWI  25  2  0  3  0  0  1  10  2  1  0  2  10 
NAM  22  3  0  7  1  0  2  2  1  2  2  1  5 
NGA  17  1  1  2  0  0  0  7  3  4  1  0  3 
SEN  9  0  0  2  0  2  0  2  1  0  1  1  4 
SWZ  14  2  0  2  0  1  0  9  0  2  1  0  1 
SYC  2  0  0  1  0  1  0  1  1  0  0  0  0 
TUN  16  0  1  1  0  0  0  7  2  4  1  3  0 
TZA  25  0  0  5  6  1  2  10  9  3  0  1  6 
UGA  41  4  1  7  2  5  1  15  1  1  3  0  7 
ZAF  37  1  1  4  2  4  3  11  6  4  1  1  8 
ZMB  25  3  0  8  0  1  0  12  3  1  2  1  6 
ZWE  45  6  0  6  1  1  3  19  7  4  4  4  11 
                           
Totals  505  40  6  78  19  25  18  177  61  45  31  23  110 
 
* Note: row totals add up to more than the number of observations per country, since many companies indicate their involvement in more than one sector.  26
APPENDIX B: AVERAGE COUNTRY VALUES FOR MAIN VARIABLES IN TABLE I 
Country  N  LOGYL  LOGKL  LOGLAB  EXPORTER  MONOPOLY  FOREIGN  GLOBAL  LOCAL  PUBLIC 
AGO  4  12.12  13.64  5.25  0.75  0.25  0.50  0.75  0.75  4.93 
    1.80  2.34  1.90  0.50  0.50  0.58  0.50  0.5  0.88 
BFA  2  11.48  10.07  6.04  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.50  0.00  3.52 
    0.02  0.51  2.60  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.71  0.00  0.40 
BWA  24  11.10  10.32  4.84  0.50  0.08  0.46  0.08  0.08  2.55 
    1.09  1.47  1.50  0.51  0.28  0.51  0.28  0.28  0.70 
CIV  4  11.43  10.72  5.22  0.75  0.25  0.25  0.50  0.75  3.12 
    1.95  1.13  1.24  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.58  0.50  0.45 
CMR  5  8.10  8.00  5.30  0.40  0.20  0.40  0.60  1.00  4.19 
    3.96  3.40  1.77  0.55  0.45  0.55  0.55  0.00  0.64 
EGY  35  8.28  9.65  5.30  0.66  0.20  0.14  0.71  0.89  2.16 
    1.81  1.62  1.65  0.48  0.41  0.36  0.46  0.32  0.60 
ETH  18  9.17  9.19  4.71  0.39  0.00  0.00  0.50  0.67  3.47 
    0.78  1.02  1.61  0.50  0.00  0.00  0.51  0.49  0.95 
GHA  18  10.46  9.82  5.45  0.67  0.00  0.50  0.33  0.61  3.13 
    1.09  1.05  1.86  0.49  0.00  0.51  0.49  0.50  0.80 
KEN  32  9.97  9.50  5.89  0.91  0.00  0.47  0.66  0.69  4.55 
    1.35  1.26  1.61  0.30  0.00  0.51  0.48  0.47  0.75 
LSO  7  10.41  9.62  4.76  0.71  0.00  0.57  0.29  0.57  3.10 
    1.47  1.30  1.80  0.49  0.00  0.53  0.49  0.53  0.69 
MAR  8  11.59  11.26  5.70  0.88  0.00  0.50  0.25  0.38  3.06 
    0.95  1.24  1.14  0.35  0.00  0.53  0.46  0.52  0.80 
MDG  36  8.35  7.98  4.33  0.44  0.06  0.17  0.86  0.97  4.21 
    1.60  1.89  1.76  0.50  0.23  0.38  0.35  0.17  0.57 
MLI  4  10.87  9.51  4.58  1.00  0.00  0.25  0.75  1.00  4.32 
    1.52  0.94  0.87  0.00  0.00  0.50  0.50  0.00  0.52 
MOZ  14  9.89  10.10  5.28  0.57  0.07  0.64  0.93  0.71  3.98 
    1.33  1.43  1.68  0.51  0.27  0.50  0.27  0.47  0.46 
MUS  16  10.60  9.76  4.96  0.69  0.00  0.13  0.31  0.38  3.53 
    0.91  1.29  2.03  0.48  0.00  0.34  0.48  0.50  1.06 
MWI  25  9.49  8.97  5.57  0.64  0.08  0.24  0.56  0.64  3.92 
    1.52  1.43  1.67  0.49  0.28  0.44  0.51  0.49  1.00 
NAM  22  10.71  10.05  4.69  0.86  0.09  0.36  0.14  0.05  2.58 
    1.02  0.99  1.82  0.35  0.29  0.49  0.35  0.21  0.98 
NGA  17  10.16  9.83  5.88  0.53  0.06  0.24  0.65  0.82  4.09 
    0.94  1.02  1.28  0.51  0.24  0.44  0.49  0.39  0.86 
SEN  9  10.61  9.38  3.45  0.78  0.00  0.11  0.33  0.78  3.25 
    1.52  1.64  1.09  0.44  0.00  0.33  0.50  0.44  0.61 
SWZ  14  9.82  8.95  4.98  0.79  0.07  0.50  0.21  0.43  3.80 
    1.04  1.67  1.90  0.43  0.27  0.52  0.43  0.51  0.81 
SYC  2  11.31  10.09  2.59  0.00  0.00  0.50  0.00  0.00  2.33 
    0.36  1.77  2.11  0.00  0.00  0.71  0.00  0.00  0.49 
TUN  16  11.20  10.90  6.39  0.69  0.13  0.19  0.13  0.13  2.03 
    0.74  0.81  1.71  0.48  0.34  0.40  0.34  0.34  0.55 
TZA  25  10.18  9.49  4.79  0.48  0.00  0.56  0.76  0.60  3.75 
    1.03  1.26  1.58  0.51  0.00  0.51  0.44  0.50  0.90 
UGA  41  9.65  9.46  3.82  0.61  0.00  0.27  0.68  0.73  3.52 
    1.33  1.58  1.42  0.49  0.00  0.45  0.47  0.45  0.94 
ZAF  37  11.09  10.20  6.91  0.89  0.03  0.27  0.22  0.08  3.29 
    1.27  1.85  2.35  0.31  0.16  0.45  0.42  0.28  0.68 
ZMB  25  9.59  9.65  4.20  0.56  0.04  0.32  0.44  0.72  3.78 
    1.21  1.14  1.72  0.51  0.20  0.48  0.51  0.46  0.87 
ZWE  45  9.23  8.59  5.51  0.71  0.04  0.24  0.58  0.67  4.02 
      1.26  1.19  2.34  0.46  0.21  0.43  0.50  0.48  0.84 
Overall  505  9.90  9.54  5.14  0.66  0.05  0.31  0.51  0.58  3.50 
      1.61  1.63  1.93  0.47  0.23  0.46  0.50  0.49  1.04 
Numbers in italics denote standard deviations  
Values indicated under the EXPORTER, MONOPOLY, FOREIGN, GLOBAL, and LOCAL columns 
are country-level averages of the firm-level dummy variables, with possible values ranging from 0 to 1. 
In the regression results, these averages are referred to as AVEXPORTER, AVMONOPOLY, 
AVFOREIGN, AVGLOBAL and AVLOCAL, respectively.   27
APPENDIX C: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
Variable  Description 
LOGYL  Natural log of (firm’s value of total sales in past year / firm’s size of labour force).  
Prices in USD. 
LOGKL  Natural log of (firm’s value of total assets / firm’s size of labour force) 
LOGLAB  Natural log of (firm’s size of labour force), where labour force is calculated as the 
number of full-time employees plus 0.5*(the number of part-time employees). 
EXPORTER  Dummy 0-1 variable for firms that export  
MONOPOLY  Dummy 0-1 variable for firms reporting “no competitors” in their primary market 
FOREIGN  Dummy 0-1 variable for firms that are 50 percent or greater foreign 
owned/controlled 
PUBLIC  This is a broad measure of public institutions, based on a weighted average of 
component responses to ACR question I.15: “Please rate the overall quality, 
integrity and efficiency of services delivered by the following public agencies or 
services: (a) customs service/agency; (b) the judiciary/courts; (c) roads 
department/public works; (d) postal service/agency; (e) telephone service/agency; (f) 
the electric power company/agency; (g) water/sewerage service/agency; (h) public 
healthcare services/hospitals; (i) education services/schools; (j) police; (k) armed 
forces/military; (l) central government leadership; (President/PM/Cabinet); (m) the 
Parliament.” Possible answers are: (1) Very good, (2) Good, (3) Slightly Good, (4) 
Slightly Bad, (5) Bad, and (6) Very Bad.  To construct the weightings, questions (a) 
and (b) were averaged into a single measure of the Regulatory Environment; 
questions (c) through (g) were averaged into a single measure of Infrastructure; 
questions (h) and (i) were averaged into a measure of Social Services; questions (j) 
and (k) were averaged into a measure of Security; and questions (l) and (m) were 
averaged into a measure of Political Institutions.  These five sub-aggregates were in 
turn averaged (unweighted) to construct the overall PUBLIC variable. 
WHINGE  Firm’s deviation from mean country response to ACR question F.1: “ ‘I have full 
confidence in the ability of my country’s financial system to provide financing to 
private firms like mine.’ To what degree do you agree with this statement?”  
Possible answers range from (1) Fully agree to (6) Strongly disagree. 
FAIR  Firm’s response to ACR question I.6a: “In resolving business disputes, do you believe 
your country’s court system to be fair and impartial?” Possible answers are (1) Always (2) 
Mostly (3) Frequently (4) Sometimes (5) Seldom (6) Never.   
 
CORRUPTION MEASURES 




SERVICEYES  Dummy variable created from ACR question G.6.a:“Do firms like your typically 
need to make extra, unofficial payments to get connected to public services (e.g. 
electricity, phone)?”  Possible answers are (1) Always (2) Mostly (3) Frequently (4) 
Sometimes (5) Seldom (6) Never.  Answers of 4 or less are coded as SERVYES=1. 
LICENSEYES  Dummy variable created from ACR question G.6.b:“Do firms like your typically 
need to make extra, unofficial payments to get licenses and permits?”  Possible 
answers are (1) Always (2) Mostly (3) Frequently (4) Sometimes (5) Seldom (6) 
Never.  Answers of 4 or less are coded as LICEYES=1. 
TAXYES  Dummy variable created from ACR question G.6.c:“Do firms like your typically 
need to make extra, unofficial payments to deal with taxes and tax collection?”  
Possible answers are (1) Always (2) Mostly (3) Frequently (4) Sometimes (5) 
Seldom (6) Never.  Answers of 4 or less are coded as TAXYES=1. 
GOVYES  Dummy variable created from ACR question G.6.d:“Do firms like your typically 
need to make extra, unofficial payments to gain government contracts?” Possible 
answers are (1) Always (2) Mostly (3) Frequently (4) Sometimes (5) Seldom (6) 
Never.  Answers of 4 or less are coded as GOVYES=1. 
CUSTOMSYES  Dummy variable created from ACR question G.6.e:“Do firms like your typically 
need to make extra, unofficial payments to gain government contracts?”  Possible 
answers are (1) Always (2) Mostly (3) Frequently (4) Sometimes (5) Seldom (6)   28
Never.  Answers of 4 or less are coded as CUSTYES=1. 
LOCAL  Dummy variable equal to 1 if SERVICEYES, LICENSEYES, TAXYES, GOVYES, 
or CUSTOMSYES =1 
LOCAL-softer  Dummy variable equal to 1 if “softer” versions of SERVICEYES, LICENSEYES, 
TAXYES, GOVYES, or CUSTOMSYES =1, with variable individual component 
variables taking a value of 1 when initial answers are 5 or less, rather than 4 or less 
as in the original LOCAL variable 
LOCAL-tougher  Dummy variable equal to 1 if “tougher” versions of SERVICEYES, LICENSEYES, 
TAXYES, GOVYES, or CUSTOMSYES =1, with variable individual component 
variables taking a value of 1 when initial answers are 3 or less, rather than 4 or less 
as in the original LOCAL variable 





GLOBAL  Dummy variable created from ACR question G5: “In your country, irregular, 
additional payments connected with import and export permits, business licenses, 
exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection or loan applications…” 
Possible answers range from (1) = “Are required for effective business” to (6) = 
“Are rare in the business community.” Answers of 1, 2 or 3 are coded as 
GLOBAL=1. 
   
COUNTRY AVERAGES 
Variable  Description 
AVLOGYL  Mean level of LOGYL in each country 
AVLOGKL  Mean level of LOGKL in each country 
AVLOGLAB  Mean level of LOGLAB in each country 
AVMONOPOLY  Mean level of MONOPOL in each country 
AVEXPORTER  Mean level of EXPORTER in each country 
AVFOREIGN  Mean level of FOREIGN in each country 
AVGLOBAL  Mean level of GLOBAL in each country 
AVLOCAL  Mean level of LOCAL in each country 
AVPUBLIC  Mean level of PUBLIC in each country 
   29
 
APPENDIX TABLE A-1. FIRM-LEVEL PRODUCTIVITY REGRESSIONS WITH SPECIFIC CORRUPTION 
FORMS: 
 
Dependent variable  LOGYL 
Regression  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
LOGKL  0.63***  0.62***  0.63***  0.63***  0.62***  0.62***  0.63***  0.62*** 
  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04 
EXPORTER  0.17*  0.18**  0.18*  0.19*  0.18*  0.18*  0.17*  0.18* 
  0.09  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.09  0.09  0.09 
MONOPOLY  -0.73***  -0.72***  -0.73***  -0.75***  -0.74***  -0.74***  -0.72***  -0.75*** 
  0.21  0.21  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.22 
FOREIGN  0.26**  0.24**  0.24**  0.23**  0.25***  0.24**  0.25**  0.26** 
  0.11  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.11 
PUBLIC  0.22***  0.24**  0.24***  0.24***  0.23***  0.25***  0.24***  0.23*** 
  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06 
WHINGE  0.09***  -0.08***  -0.08**  -0.07**  -0.08**  -0.08***  -0.09***  -0.08*** 
  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03 
LICENSEYES  -0.13               
  0.10               
SERVICEYES    -0.24**             
    0.10             
TAXYES      -0.29***           
      0.10           
GOVYES        -0.33***         
        0.10         
CUSTOMSYES          -0.17***       
          0.10       
LOCAL-softer             -0.23***     
            0.08     
LOCAL-tougher              -0.18**   
              0.08   
LOCAL-select                -0.25*** 
                0.08 
Constant  3.77***  3.77***  3.73***  3.73***  3.81***  3.88***  3.76***  3.87*** 
  0.52  0.51  0.50  0.49  0.51  0.52  0.51  0.50 
Country Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs.  503  505  497  480  493  505  505  505 
R
2  0.73  0.73  0.73  0.73  0.73  0.73  0.73  0.73 
Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the country level, are indicated in parentheses.   
*** denotes p-values at the 1% level or lower; ** denotes 5% level; * denotes 10% level 
 
“LOCAL-softer” is a modified measure of LOCAL that sets a lower (i.e. less frequent) standard for the 
presence of corruption. “LOCAL-tougher” sets a higher (i.e. more frequent) standard for the presence 
of corruption. “LOCAL-select” differs from LOCAL in that it does not include LICEYES in its 
composition, since that variable is not independently significant in regression 1 of the above table.  
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1 Much of the empirical macroeconomic research on corruption’s links to growth and investment was 
stimulated by Mauro [1995]. Other important macro studies have indicated that corruption acts as a tax 
on foreign investment (Wei 1997a, 1997b], leads to increases in bureaucratic red tape [Kaufmann and 
Wei, 1999], supports larger unofficial economies [Friedman et al., 2000] and indirectly enhances the 
conditions for currency crises [Wei and Wu, 2001]. There is, however, an increasing interest in the 
micro effects [e.g., Fisman and Svensson, 1999]. 
2 Although the full ACR data set contains data on nearly 1,700 firms, we reduce the sample for our 
analysis to 505 by deleting those firms with missing observations for relevant variables as well as those 
with capital/labour ratios of greater than 30 or less than 0.1, the latter modification aiming to delete 
wild outliers and probable misreporting. 
3 Details of the questions and the scale can be found in Appendix C. 
4 This would support the evidence put forward by Nickell [1996]. 
5 (0.18 = 1 - e-0.20). To check whether the results in Column 3 are a product of the somewhat arbitrary 
cut-off between survey answers of “sometimes” and “seldom” instead of between “frequently” and 
“sometimes” in the construction of LICENSEYES, SERVICEYES, GOVYES, CUSTOMSYES, and 
TAXYES, we created a second variable that sets a higher standard for the presence of corruption, so 
that each of the binary measures of firm-level corruption take a value of 1 if respondents gave answers 
of 3 (“frequently”) or less instead of 4 (“sometimes”) or less. The results for this variable, named 
“LOCAL-tougher” are almost exactly the same as those for LOCAL. Likewise we created an 
“LOCAL-softer” variable that set a cut-off at 5 (“seldom”) instead of 4. Again the results were not 
statistically different from those for LOCAL. This suggests that the exact cut-off for the construction of 
the local corruption variable does not appear to be driving our overall estimation of zi effects. These 
and other robustness checks are presented in Appendix Table A-1.   
6 More precisely, firms with an average PUBLIC score that is one standard deviation higher (i.e. worse) 
than the mean are on average 30 percent more productive per unit of labour. (0.30 = 1 - e
1.04*0.25) 
7 The rejection of endogeneity for ANYCOR is further supported by Hausman-Sargan 
overidentification tests of instrumental variables regressions that used a variety of instruments.  
8 3.2 = (1 - e-1..33)/(1 - e-0.26) 
 